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Abstract
Background: The Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 virus has dramatically spread throughout Southeast Asia since
its first detection in 1997. Merit Release Birds, such as the Eurasian Tree Sparrow, are believed to increase one’s positive
karma when kissed and released during Buddhist rituals. Since these birds are often in close contact with both poultry and
humans, we investigated their potential role in the spread of H5N1 virus.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Seven series of experiments were conducted in order to investigate the possible
interactions between inoculated and exposed birds, including sparrow/sparrow, sparrow/chicken, duck/sparrow. Daily and
post-mortem samples collected were tested for H5N1 virus by real-time RT-PCR and egg inoculation. When directly
inoculated, Eurasian Tree Sparrows were highly susceptible to the H5N1 virus, with a fatality rate approaching 100% within 5
days post-inoculation. Although transmission of fatal infection between sparrows did not occur, seroconversion of the
exposed birds was observed. Up to 100% chickens exposed to inoculated sparrows died of H5N1 infection, depending on
the caging conditions of the birds, while a fatality rate of 50% was observed on sparrows exposed to infected ducks. Large
quantities of H5N1 virus were detected in the sparrows, particularly in their feathers, from which infectious particles were
recovered.
Conclusions/Significance: Our study indicates that under experimental conditions, Eurasian Tree Sparrows are susceptible
to H5N1 infection, either by direct inoculation or by contact with infected poultry. Their ability to transmit H5N1 infection to
other birds is also demonstrated, suggesting that the sparrows may play a role in the dissemination of the virus. Finally, the
presence of significant quantities of H5N1 virus on sparrows’ feathers, including infectious particles, would suggest that
Merit Release Birds represent a risk for human contamination in countries where avian influenza virus is circulating and
where this religious ritual is practiced.
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Introduction
The Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus has
dramatically spread throughout Southeast Asia since its first
detection in 1997 [1]. Over 560 human cases were reported so far
to the World Health Organization (WHO), around 60% of them
being fatal [2]. Asia has been the most affected continent,
accounting for 73% of the total number of confirmed cases, and
84% of the fatalities worldwide. In Cambodia, a total of 28
outbreaks were reported in poultry since the first detection of the
HPAI H5N1 virus in the country in 2004 [3] and 18 confirmed
human cases were reported to the WHO, including 16 fatalities
[2].
Buddhism is the major religion in several Southeast Asian
countries, especially in Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Cambodia,
where 67%, 89%, 95% and 97% of the national population
consider themselves as Buddhists respectively, amounting to
almost 130 million people [4]. In China, although a lower
percentage of the population is officially declared as Buddhist (11–
16%), this proportion still represents 200 million people and in
reality almost 50% of the Vietnamese are probably practicing this
religion [5]. Buddhist life is governed by a number of unassailable
rituals. The practice of life releasing is one of the most popular in
Southeast Asia. Buddhism considers that all animals are sentient
beings, and have, as such, the potential to attain Buddhahood, i.e.
enlightenment. Besides, according to the Buddhist principle of
perpetual reincarnations, any living being has also been at one
time one’s relative. Thus, among all positive karma (i.e. good
actions), that of releasing life is considered to be the highest. Many
people, in Southeast Asia, are Buddhist followers who purchase
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those Merit Release Birds (MRBs), mostly Passerine species, in
pagodas, raise them in cupped palms to their lips, kiss them, and
then release them.
The implications of such ritual in the transmission of zoonotic
diseases have not been widely studied before [6,7]. However, close
physical contact between wild birds and humans could be a great
risk factor for the transmission of infectious diseases such as avian
influenza.
Although wild waterfowl is thought to be a natural reservoir of
all influenza subtypes [8], little is known about terrestrial wild
birds. Passerine species are known to be susceptible to HPAI
H5N1 infection [9–16], even though their susceptibility can vary
depending on the bird species or the viral strain. Natural infections
were also described [12,17–21]. Nonetheless, the exact role of
those birds in the natural cycle of H5N1 virus was never
determined.
In order to better understand this role, we conducted a number
of experiments. We investigated the susceptibility of sparrows to
HPAI H5N1 infection, their ability to transmit the virus to
chickens, as well as their ability to get contaminated through
contact with infected ducks. In parallel, we studied the survival of
the virus on infected sparrows’ feathers. This study led us to a
better understanding of the potential role of the Merit Release
Birds in the H5N1 virus natural contamination cycle.
Methods
Biosafety and Ethics Statement
All experiments using HPAI H5N1 virus and all animal
experiments were carried out in the BioSafety level 3 Laboratory
(BSL-3) of the Institut Pasteur in Cambodia, complying with the
Animal Committee regulations of Institut Pasteur in Paris, France,
in accordance with the EC 86/609/CEE directive, and approved
by the Animal Ethics Committee of Institut Pasteur in Cambodia
(permit number: AEC/IPC/001/2008).
Animals
Eurasian Tree Sparrows (Passer montanus) were purchased at
surrounding Buddhist pagodas in Phnom Penh (Cambodia). They
were maintained for a minimum of 5 days for acclimation before
inclusion into the experiments. Specific Pathogen Free (SPF)
chickens and ducks, of local Cambodian breeds, 4-to-6-weeks old,
were kindly provided by the NaVRI. Before inoculation, oro-
pharyngeal and cloacal swabs, feathers, as well as blood samples
were collected from the birds (all chickens and ducks, and in a
subset of randomly selected sparrows of each batch purchased) in
order to exclude preexisting exposure to H5N1 virus. All swabs
and feathers were stored in viral transport medium (VTM) at
280uC until testing. Blood samples were centrifuged at 3000 rpm
for 15 minutes and tested by serology. During the experiments, all
birds were housed in self-contained isolation units (Cap Engineer-
ing B.V. HM1500 Isolator) ventilated under negative pressure
with High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA)-filtered air, with 12
daily hours of artificial lighting. Commercial food and water were
provided ad libitum.
Virus
The HPAI H5N1 virus used in this study was the strain A/
Chicken/Cambodia/LC1AL/2007 (GenBank accession numbers
HQ200574-200581). The virus stock was obtained after 3 passages
in SPF 9-to-11-days old embryonated hen eggs (kindly provided by
the National Veterinary Research Institute of Cambodia (NaVRI),
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries and Fisheries (MAFF)) for 48
hours at 37uC. The amnio-allantoic fluid was then harvested and
stored at 280uC until further use. Virus titer was determined by
calculating the 50% egg infectious dose (EID50) per mL of virus
stock. Titration endpoints were calculated using the method of
Reed and Muench [22]. To determine the mean lethal dose
(LD50) of the virus in sparrows, groups of 5 birds were inoculated
via nasal, oral, ocular, and cloacal routes, with serial 10-fold
dilution of virus. After the inoculation, sparrows were monitored
daily for clinical signs and death for 14 days. The LD50 was
calculated by the method of Reed and Muench [22]. The number
of RNA copies per mL of virus solution was also determined using
the qRT-PCR method described below.
Experimental design and settings
Seven types of experiments were conducted so as to investigate
3 transmission routes: sparrows’ ability to transmit H5N1 infection
to each other (A), sparrows’ ability to transmit H5N1 infection to
chickens (B), and sparrows’ ability to be contaminated through
contact with infected ducks (C). See Table 1 for details.
Table 1. Seven different experimental settings.
Principles #
Animals (or materials)
inoculated on Day0
Inoculum dose
(EID50)
Animals introduced
on Day1 Containment conditions & remarks
Sparrows’ ability to transmit
H5N1 virus to each other
A.1 Sparrows (n = 8) 106 /sparrow Sparrows (n = 7) All sparrows were freed in the isolator
A.2 Sparrows (n = 10) 106 /sparrow Sparrows (n = 11) All sparrows were confined in the same
cage within the isolator
Sparrows’ ability to transmit
H5N1 virus to chickens
B.1 Sparrows (n = 12) 106 /sparrow Chickens (n = 20) All birds were freed in the isolator
B.2. Sparrows (n = 5) 106 /sparrow Chickens (n = 6) The sparrows were caged, whereas the
chickens were freed in the isolator
B.3 Chickens (n = 5) 105.23 /chicken none All chickens were freed in the isolator
B.4 Water 105.23 in 1L of water none Chickens (n = 5) were introduced into the
isolator containing the contaminated
water on D0
Sparrows’ ability to be
contaminated through
contact with infected ducks
C Ducks (n = 40) 106 /duck Sparrows (n = 6) All birds were freed in the whole isolator
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028609.t001
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Inoculations were made on day 0 (D0), and birds exposed to
inoculated animals were introduced into the isolators on D1. Birds
exposed to H5N1 virus contaminated water were introduced on
D0 (Table 1, B.4). Inoculations on birds were made through nasal,
ocular, oral and cloacal routes with total volumes of inocula
varying from 50 mL (sparrows) to 500 mL (poultry). Different
containment conditions were tested for sparrows: they were either
left to freely fly around inside the isolator, or contained into a
barred cage within the isolator. The standard inoculum dose was
defined as 106 EID50 (equivalent to 104.63 LD50 and 109.65 RNA
copies) per bird. Two experiments were carried out with a
modified inoculum dose of 105.23 EID50, which was determined as
representing the total amount of virus shed by 24 infected
sparrows during one hour through their feces (Table 1, B.3-B.4).
All experiments were conducted twice. For each experiment, a
control group was created with an equal number of birds, and the
same experimental design was applied using a sham-inoculum.
After inoculation, oral and cloacal swabs, as well as feathers,
were collected daily, and stored in VTM at 280uC until further
analysis. All samples collected before and after inoculation/
exposition were tested following the protocols described below.
All birds were observed for expression of clinical signs of illness
on a daily basis. The main clinical signs expected included: cloudy
and/or watery eyes, head and/or face oedema, cyanosis,
weakness, anorexia, depression, ruffled feathers, neurological signs
(tremors, seizures, incoordination, paralysis, torticollis, etc.),
respiratory difficulties, diarrhea, and death. The birds that were
still alive 15 days after infection or exposure to contaminated
animals or water were killed humanly.
Post-mortem examination and collection of samples were
conducted on all animals. The samples collected post-mortem
included: blood, oral and cloacal swabs, feathers, and organs such
as trachea, muscle, heart, liver, spleen, air sacs, intestines, kidneys,
lungs, and brain. All oral and cloacal swabs, and feathers, were
stored in VTM at 280uC. All organs were stored in Phosphate
Buffer Saline (PBS) at 280uC on one hand, in 10% neutral
buffered formalin at room temperature on the other hand.
RNA extraction, Real-time PCR testing (H5)
Supernatants were collected from swabs stored in VTM and
directly processed for RNA extraction. Solid samples, such as
feathers and organs, stored in VTM or PBS, went through a
homogenization step before RNA extraction, using the MagNa
Lyser Instrument (Roche Diagnostics, Mannheim, Germany).
RNA was extracted using the MagNa Pure LC Total Nucleic Acid
Isolation Kit (Roche) and the MagNa Pure LC Instrument
(Roche). The extracted RNAs were tested with quantitative real-
time Retro-Transcription and Polymerase Chain Reaction (qRT-
PCR) targeting the H5 hemagglutinin gene (H5HA), using the
primers H5HA-205-227v2-For (59 – CGA TCT AGA YGG GGT
GAA RCC TC – 39) and H5HA-326-302v2-Rev (59 – CCT TCT
CCA CTA TGT ANG ACC ATT C – 39), and the probes H5-
Probe-239-RVa (59 – (Fam) – AGC CAY CCA GCT ACR CTA
CA – (MGB) – 39) and H5-Probe-239-RVb (59 – (Fam) – AGC
CAT CCC GCA ACA CTA CA – (MGB) – 39 [23], on a Bio-Rad
iQ5 Multicolor Real-Time PCR Detection (Bio-Rad). H5
quantified synthetic RNA was used as internal control and to
determine the viral load. Viral loads were expressed in number of
viral RNA copies per milliliter of supernatants (swabs), or per gram
of sample (organs and feathers).
Serology testing
Serum samples were treated with receptor-destroying enzyme
RDE (II) ‘‘SEIKEN’’ (Denka Seiken Co., LTD, Japan) as
instructed by the manufacturer, and then heat-inactivated at
56uC for 30 minutes. Hemagglutination inhibition (HI) tests were
then performed using 0.5% chicken red blood cells. HI titers were
determined as the reciprocal of the highest serum dilution that
inhibited the agglutination of 4 hemagglutining units (HAU) of
virus. Sera with HI titers $16 units were considered positive for
the presence of anti-influenza antibodies [24].
Histopathology and immunohistochemistry
Immunohistochemical staining of the tissues obtained from
MRBs only was carried out for the influenza nucleoprotein using
HB65 (European Veterinary Laboratories, Netherlands) as
described in previously published reports [25].
Infectious H5N1 particles on sparrows’ feathers
Feathers obtained from all sparrows were first homogenized
using the MagNa Lyser Instrument (Roche). Each homogenized
sample was then inoculated onto three 9-to-11-days old SPF hen
eggs and incubated during 48 to 72 hours at 37uC. An
hemagglutination (HA) assay was performed on all eggs after
each passage, in order to detect infectious H5N1 particles. Positive
HA results were further confirmed by qRT-PCR.
Results
Susceptibility of the various bird species to direct
inoculation of HPAI H5N1 virus
Sparrows, ducks and chickens were highly susceptible to the
HPAI H5N1 strain used when directly inoculated, with overall
fatality rates of 97%, 85% and 100% respectively. No symptoms
were observed in chickens, which all died on D2 post-inoculation
(Figure 1). As for the ducks that died after direct inoculation, the
mean death time (MDT) was 3.7 days (Table 2), and all of them
experienced neurological signs including tremors, severe incoor-
dination, repeated falls, absence of voluntary movements, pedaling
movements, circling, phases of severe despondency, as well as
cloudy eyes and facial oedema prior to death. Sparrows infected
by direct inoculation, in contrast, exhibited mild clinical signs such
as depression, huddling, anorexia, ruffled feathers, and no
neurological signs. Except for the few birds which survived the
inoculation, death occurred within 4 days on average.
Moderate nephromegaly, splenomegaly, liver discolouration,
pancreatomegaly, cholecystomegaly, hyperdilatation of brain
blood vessels, hemorrhagic lungs, and pericarditis were among
the occasional abnormalities observed during the post-mortem
examinations of all bird species used in this study.
Immunohistochemical staining of the tissues confirmed the
presence of H5N1 antigen in several Passerine’s tissues, namely
skeletal and cardiac muscles, trachea, liver and lungs (Figure S1).
High viral loads were detected in all samples collected post-
mortem from birds lethally infected through direct inoculation
(Figure 2). Swabs’ specimens showed mean viral loads of 107.72,
106.91, and 107.13 viral RNA copies per mL of VTM for inoculated
sparrows, ducks and chickens respectively. Our observations also
allowed us to determine the total amount of virus shed by 24
infected sparrows during one hour through their feces, at 105.23
EID50. This was the concentration used in experiments B.3 and
B.4. Mean viral loads found in inoculated sparrows’, ducks’ and
chickens’ organs were respectively of 109.93, 1010.24, and 109.52
RNA copies per gram on average. As for feathers, respective mean
values of 109.50, 1010.37, and 109.50 viral RNA copies per gram
were determined for sparrows, chickens and ducks.
All surviving birds seroconverted (Table 3).
H5N1 in Merit Release Birds
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Sparrows’ ability to transmit HPAI H5N1 virus to each
other (Table 1, A)
Regardless of the conditions of containment of the birds,
exposure of naı¨ve sparrows to inoculated ones did not lead to any
clinical manifestation nor death, despite a 100% mortality rate
observed in inoculated MRBs in the A.1 and A.2 experiments
(Table 2, A; Figure 3). No virus was detected in any of the samples
collected post-mortem from the exposed sparrows. However,
seroconversion was observed for 28% of them.
Sparrows’ ability to transmit HPAI H5N1 virus to chickens
(Table 1, B)
When left to freely fly within the whole isolator, the sparrows
did not transmit H5N1 infection to the chickens (Table 2, B.1). No
mortality, no symptoms, no viral RNA, and no seroconversion
were observed in any of the exposed chickens. However,
transmission did occur when chickens were confined in the
isolator with caged sparrows. The clinical symptoms observed
included huddling, weight loss, anorexia, and depression. Death
occurred in all chickens exposed to caged sparrows within a MDT
of 6.5 days post-exposure (Figure 1, Table 2, B.2). Viral loads
determined in samples collected post-mortem from those chickens
were high, with an average of 107.27 RNA copies per mL for
swabs’ specimens, 108.04 RNA copies per gram for feathers, and
1010.16 RNA copies per gram for organs (Figure 2). Exposure of
chickens to water contaminated with sparrows’ feces did not lead
to any clinical infection (Table 2, B.4). All chickens exposed to
contaminated drinking water survived, and no virus was detected
in the organs collected during the necropsies. However, anti-H5
Table 2. Mortality rates, mean viral loads.
#{ Animals infected experimentally Animals exposed
Sp* FR* MDT* MVL*{ (no. RNA copies) Sp* FR* MDT* MVL*{ (no. RNA copies)
Swab Feather Organ Swab Feather Organ
A.1 SPR 100 4.1 2.746108 1.1361010 6.0161010 SPR 0 NA 0 0 0
A.2 SPR 100 3.7 2.896106 1.566106 3.376109 SPR 0 NA 0 0 0
B.1 SPR 100 4 6.426105 4.346106 1.886109 CK 0 NA 0 0 0
B.2 SPR 80 4 1.246107 8.126102 6.376109 CK 100 6.5 1.876107 1.106108 1.4461010
B.3 CK 100 2 1.356107 3.166109 3.306109 NA NA NA NA NA NA
B.4 NA NA NA NA NA NA CK 0 NA 0 0 0
C DK 85 3.7 8.156106 2.3561010 1.7461010 SPR 50 9 1.936106 2.596108 5.446109
*Sp = Species (CK = Chicken, DK = Duck, SPR = Sparrow); FR = Fatality Rate (%); MDT = Mean Death Time (days); MVL = Mean Viral Load (no. RNA copies) per mL of
swab’s supernatant (Swabs), per gram of feathers (Feather), per gram of organ (Organ); NA = Not Applicable.
{MVL reported here include data recorded from lethally infected birds only.
{All values appearing in the # column correspond to the 7 different experimental settings described in Table 1: A = Sparrows’ ability to transmit H5N1 virus to each
other when freed in the isolator (A.1) or caged (A.2.); B.1 & B.2 = Sparrows’ ability to transmit H5N1 virus to chickens when freed in the isolator (B.1) or caged (B.2); B.3
& B.4 = Chickens’ susceptibility to H5N1 when inoculated with 105.23 EID50, dose determined as representing the total amount of virus shed by 24 infected sparrows
during one hour through their feces, through direct inoculation (B.3.) or through exposure to contaminated water (B.4); C = Sparrows’ ability to be contaminated
through contact with infected ducks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028609.t002
Figure 1. Death kinetics of all birds directly or indirectly exposed to HPAI H5N1 virus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028609.g001
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antibodies were detected in one chicken’s serum, suggesting a
subclinical infection (Table 3).
Sparrows’ ability to be contaminated through contact
with HPAI H5N1 infected ducks (Table 1, C)
H5N1 viral RNA was detected in 67% of the sparrows exposed
to inoculated ducks, with a case fatality rate of 50%. Deadly
contaminated sparrows showed high viral loads in all organs
(Figure 2), while in the surviving ones, the viral loads were much
lower and detected only in some of the organs tested:
approximately 104.55 RNA copies per mL for swabs’ specimens,
105.09 RNA copies per gram for feathers, and 104.72 RNA copies
per gram for organs. Precisely, quantitative RT-PCR tested
negative in trachea, brain and liver samples, and tested positive in
all other organs.
H5N1 particles detected on infected sparrows’ feathers
Feathers of 94 sparrows were tested. A total of 50 birds tested
positive for the presence of viral RNA on their feathers, and 24
were found to carry infectious particles on their feathers.
Discussion
Here, Eurasian Tree Sparrows were shown to be highly
susceptible to the HPAI H5N1 strain used. However, the
transmission of the virus between sparrows themselves was quite
low, be it released in a wide space (14% of seroconversion) or
contained in a narrow cage (36% of seroconversion), and led only
to asymptomatic infections with no detectable virus infection or
shedding (Table 3, Figure 3), suggesting that introduction by
sellers of infected MRBs into the cages together with naı¨ve birds
might not lead to efficient infection dissemination. Although the
viral loads (,108.44 viral copies per mL) detected in swabs
specimens collected from deadly infected birds correspond to the
viral load that would have been measured in 103.42 LD50 of
inoculum, this does not mean that all the viruses detected by
qRT-PCR were infectious. In addition, the infection of animals is
probably less efficient after natural exposure then through
experimental inoculation directly in the respiratory and digestive
tracts.
Similarly, when exposed to infected sparrows freed in the
isolator, no chickens were infected despite their high susceptibility
to the strain used (Table 1, B.1). There was no transmission of
virus from the sparrows to the chickens, even though the formers
did shed virus through cloacal and oral routes and high viral
loads were detected on their feathers (Figure 2). The birds were
all freely wandering around in the isolators, sharing the same
food and water trays. These confinement conditions were meant
to simulate, as faithfully as possible - considering the biosafety
constraints - real field conditions. In the isolators, sparrows were
provided with a high-located bar so that they could stay away
Figure 2. Mean viral loads in samples collected post-mortem. *NA = not available. Data presented include only birds that died following
H5N1 infection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028609.g002
Table 3. Seroconversion rates in surviving birds.
#{ Animals inoculated Animals exposed
Sp* SR* Sp* SR*
A.1 SPR NA SPR 14
A.2 SPR NA SPR 36
B.1 SPR NA CK 0
B.2 SPR 100 CK NA
B.3 CK NA NA NA
B.4 NA NA CK 20
C DK 100 SPR 50
*Sp = Species (CK = Chicken, DK = Duck, SPR = Sparrow); SR =
Seroconversion Rate in surviving birds (%); NA = Not Applicable.
{All values appearing in the # column correspond to the 7 different
experiments described in Table 1: A = Sparrows’ ability to transmit H5N1
infection to each other when freed in the isolator (A.1) or caged (A.2.); B.1 &
B.2 = Sparrows’ ability to transmit H5N1 infection to chickens when freed in
the isolator (B.1) or caged (B.2); B.3 & B.4 = Chickens’ susceptibility to H5N1
when inoculated with 105.23 EID50, dose determined as representing the total
amount of virus shed by 24 infected sparrows during one hour through their
feces, through direct inoculation (B.3.) or through exposure to contaminated
water (B.4); C = Sparrows’ ability to be contaminated through contact with
infected ducks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028609.t003
H5N1 in Merit Release Birds
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from the chickens when needed, as they would in natural
conditions.
Nonetheless, on the other hand, when caged and unable to
escape from the chickens, transmission occurred. The caging,
instead of protecting and separating the sparrows from the
chickens, made them more vulnerable. They were placed in a
stressful situation, in which chickens perpetually harassed them
through the bars, and were able to easily peck them. This behavior
led to the chickens’ infection.
In order to better understand the absence of H5N1 virus
transmission from sparrows to chickens when close contacts are not
forced, we tried to evaluate the level of exposure of the chickens to
the avian influenza virus during the experiment. We estimated that
24 infected sparrows shed through feces the amount of 105.23 EID50
virus per hour. We considered these conditions as extreme since the
probability of having 24 infected sparrows spending one full hour
dropping their feces either directly into a chicken’s external orifices,
or into the same liter of water, was highly unlikely. Our findings
demonstrated that even at this dose, the seeded drinking water was
not able to cause clinical disease in chickens, whereas the same dose
was proved to be lethal when directly inoculated to chickens
through nasal, ocular, oral and cloacal routes (Table 2, B.3-B.4).
Thus, these results suggest that MRBs might not be able to shed a
sufficient quantity of H5N1 virus in the environment to infect
poultry in field conditions, unless carcasses of sparrows infected by
H5N1 virus are pecked at, i.e. scavenged by chickens. Indeed, while
viral particles shed by infected sparrows in the environment through
their feces might be at too low a concentration to efficiently infect
the poultry [26], chickens’ common propensity for pica could result
in the scavenging of highly infectious carcasses, and thus allow the
virus to spread from one host to another and from place to place.
Infected sparrows carcasses might also be eaten by carnivores or by
various scavenger birds species which may also contribute to the
virus dissemination.
Efficient viral transmission also occurred from ducks to
sparrows. Ducks are often incriminated in the silent spread of
influenza A viruses, because of their frequent ability to undergo
asymptomatic infections [27–31]. Thus, our data suggest that in
areas where H5N1 virus is circulating in domestic birds, sparrows
might get infected through contact with infected poultry, which
could probably explain most of the natural contaminations of
sparrows documented in the literature [12,17–21]. It is noteworthy
that it took around 9 days for these sparrows to die of H5N1
infection after close contact with infected ducks (Table 2, C). The
hypothesis of having infectious sparrows flying from farm to farm
or being carried from one place to another for religious purposes,
while having repeated contacts with humans therefore cannot be
ruled out, especially as our study shows that infected sparrows
display usually relatively few clinical symptoms.
Several infected sparrows were carrying infectious particles on
their feathers. The presence of H5N1 virus antigens in feather
follicles, associated with histological lesions, was first assessed and
described by Perkins and Swayne in 2001 [32]. Since then, some
studies have explored the role of feathers in HPAI virus cycles [33–
39]. These studies showed the presence and persistence of
infectious particles in feathers as long as 5 days after the death
of the animal [33]. Evidence of the presence of viable particles on
feathers was also provided from asymptomatic birds [37]. Thus,
the potential role of infected feathers in the transmission cycle of
H5N1 virus should not be neglected in the context of popular
Buddhist rituals, for which birds are to be manipulated and even
kissed. In addition, one H5N1 virus isolated from a tree sparrow in
Figure 3. Paths of transmission of H5N1 virus between birds. FR = Fatality Rate; SR = Seroconversion Rate; VDR = Virus Detection Rate;
NA = not available. Arrows and their respective black-filled rectangles correspond to the different experimental settings described in Table 1: A =
Sparrows’ ability to transmit H5N1 virus to each other when freed in the isolator (A.1.) or caged (A.2.); B.1 & B.2 = Sparrows’ ability to transmit H5N1
virus to chickens when freed in the isolator (B.1) or caged (B.2); C = Sparrows’ ability to be contaminated through contact with infected ducks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028609.g003
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 December 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 12 | e28609
Indonesia was recently found to be genetically closely related to
human viruses previously detected in the same island, suggesting
that humans and MRBs are susceptible to similar strains of the
virus [20]. Thus, even though sparrow-to-human transmission of
H5N1 virus was never documented, such transmission is in theory
possible and MRBs might indeed represent a potential risk for
human and animal contamination.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Immunohistochemical analysis for H5N1
virus nucleoprotein detection in merit release birds’
organs (experimentally infected). Immunohistochemical
staining of the tissues was carried out for the influenza
nucleoprotein detection in sparrows’ tissues. A) Lung section:
arrows are pointing at few infected cells (red-purple). B) Liver
section: numerous influenza-infected cells appear in red.
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